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Abstract—In this work, we present P4-IPsec, a concept
for IPsec in software-defined networks (SDN) using P4 pro-
grammable data planes. The prototype implementation features
ESP in tunnel mode and supports different cipher suites. P4-
capable switches are programmed to serve as IPsec tunnel
endpoints. We also provide a client agent to configure tunnel
endpoints on Linux hosts so that site-to-site and host-to-site
application scenarios can be supported which are the base for
virtual private networks (VPNs). While traditional VPNs require
complex key exchange protocols like IKE to set up and renew
tunnel endpoints, P4-IPsec benefits from an SDN controller to
accomplish these tasks. One goal of this experimental work
is to investigate how well P4-IPsec can be implemented on
existing P4 switches. We present a prototype for the BMv2
P4 software switch, evaluate its performance, and publish its
source code on GitHub [1]. We explain why we could not
provide a useful implementation with the NetFPGA SUME
board. For the Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X Tofino-based switch,
we presented two prototype implementations to cope with a
missing crypto unit. As another contribution of this paper, we
provide technological background of P4 and IPsec and give a
comprehensive review of security applications in P4, IPsec in
SDN, and IPsec data plane implementations. According to our
knowledge, P4-IPsec is the first implementation of IPsec for P4-
based SDN.
Index Terms—IPsec, P4, software-defined networking, VPN
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) extend private networks
across public networks by adding authentication and encryp-
tion to network traffic. Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is
one of the oldest, but still most-widespread VPN protocols.
Standardized by the IETF, it introduces protection on the
Internet Protocol (IP) layer. Due to its large distribution, many
implementations for network appliances and operating systems
are available. Although it is criticized for its complexity,
proven deployment patterns allow efficient and reliable op-
eration.
IPsec tunnel setup requires user configuration plus keying
material that is exchanged by IPsec peers via the Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) protocol. Complexity grows with the number
of IPsec peers, especially in highly dynamic environments
such as campus or enterprise networks with many users and
sites. Several works investigate on how to leverage the cen-
tralized control plane of software-defined networking (SDN)
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to simplify IPsec operation. However, the possibilities for
IPsec deployment in SDN were limited. Typical SDN switches
have a fixed-function data plane that does not provide support
for IPsec. As a result, IPsec data plane processing needs to
be moved to an additional software-based packet processing
function (PPF). Besides being an additional component, this
adds latency as traffic needs to be forwarded back and forth.
Programmable data planes as offered by P4 are a game
changer. Data plane behavior can be described in a high-
level programming language. Those network programs can
be executed by software or hardware devices. For IPsec this
means that instead of shifting IPsec functionality to PPFs,
functions such as IPsec can be implemented directly on the
data plane of SDN switches. In our previous work P4-MACsec
[2], we introduced MACsec for P4-based SDN. We proposed
a data plane implementation in P4 and introduced a novel
concept for automated deployment and operation of MACsec.
In this paper, we present the first integration of IPsec
VPN for P4-based SDN. We give an introduction on the
technological background and provide an extensive survey on
related work in that field. We present an IPsec data plane im-
plementation that integrates IPsec components and processes
with constructs and components under the given constraints
of the P4 data plane programming language. Cryptographic
operations for authentication, encryption, and decryption are
implemented in P4 externs where IPsec components such as
the Security Policy Database (SPD) and Security Association
Database (SAD) are part of the P4 processing pipeline. P4
switches that implement the functionality of P4-IPsec can
be deployed in host-to-site and site-to-site VPN scenarios.
Control plane functions for IPsec operation are part of a
central SDN controller that maintains IPsec tunnels without
the help of distributed key exchange protocols such as IKE.
As these components are steered by a centralized control plane
through an authenticated and encrypted control connection,
complex IKE-based key exchange protocols are substituted
by controller-based tunnel setup and renewal procedures.
For host-to-site operation, we introduce a client agent for
Linux operating systems that runs on the roadwarrior hosts.
It establishes an interface to the central SDN controller via
a gRPC connection. To investigate how well P4-IPsec can
be implemented on existing P4 targets, we work on three
prototypes. We successfuly implement a prototype for the
Behavioral Model version 2 (BMv2) P4 software target and
conduct a performance evaluation. We release the source code
of our prototype along its testbed environment under the
Apache v2 license on GitHub [1]. In addition, we report on
implementation experiences for the NetFPGA SUME board
and Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X P4 switch. For the latter, we
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present two workaround implementation and compare them in
performance experiments.
P4-IPsec introduces several benefits over traditional IPsec
operation. First, we improve scalability by making switches
and roadwarrior hosts stateless components whose functional-
ity is only managed by an SDN controller. Second, we improve
flexibility by converting P4 targets into IPsec endpoints, i.e.,
IPsec tunnels can terminate close to the network hosts that
should be made accessible via the VPN. This limits the size
of the perimeter and improves security through better isolation.
Last, we encourage open networking research and operation.
Network functionality can be modified in agile development
processes, source code can be audited and improved by a larger
audience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview on IPsec VPN and data plane programming
with P4. In Section III, we describe related work on P4-based
network security applications, IPsec in SDN, and IPsec data
plane implementations. Section IV presents the architecture of
P4-IPsec. In Section V, we describe the prototypical imple-
mentation of P4-IPsec with Mininet and BMv2. Section VI
presents the performance evaluation of that prototype. In
Section VII, we report implementation experiences for the
NetFPGA SUME and Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X P4 targets.
Section VIII concludes this work. The appendices include a
list of the acronyms used in the paper.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
We give an introduction to VPN with IPsec and data plane
programming with P4.
A. IPsec VPN
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a widespread VPN
protocol suite. It applies authentication and encryption on the
IP in host-to-host, gateway-to-gateway, and host-to-gateway
communication scenarios. RFC 4301 [3] is the latest version
of its specification.
1) Protocols: IPsec comprises the Authentication Header
(AH) and Encrypted Secured Payload (ESP) protocol. AH
[4] protects IP packets by sender authentication and packet
integrity validation. It applies a hash function with a shared
key (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) to calculate Integrity Check Val-
ues (ICVs) and adds packet sequence numbers to protect
against replay attacks. ESP [5] protects the confidentiality
of IP packets by symmetric encryption. As for AH, it also
adds sender authentication, packet integrity validation, and
protection against replay attacks. ESP supports symmetric
ciphers such as Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
Blowfish, and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Ciphers
that only apply encryption are combined with an authen-
tication function. AES in cipher block chaining (CBC) or
counter (CTR) mode are examples for such ciphers that
might be combined with secure hash algorithm (SHA) for
authentication. authenticated encryption (AE) ciphers such as
AES in galois/counter mode (GCM) [6] include both, packet
encryption and authentication. IPsec provides support for IP
Payload Compression (IPComp) [7] so that the payload of IP
packets can be compressed before encryption.
2) Operation Modes: IPsec can be deployed in either
transport or tunnel operation mode. Transport mode protects
IP traffic that is exchanged between two network hosts (host-
to-host scenario). An AH or ESP header is inserted between
the IP header and the IP payload. Tunnel mode protects IP
traffic host-to-host, host-to-site, and site-to-site communication
scenarios. Figure 1 depicts how tunnel mode with ESP is
applied to an IP packet. A new outer IP header with the
IP addresses of the IPsec peers is created. The original IP
packet is inserted between the ESP header and the ESP trailer.
Encryption protects the original IP packet while authentication
is applied to the complete ESP packet.
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Fig. 1. Tunnel mode with ESP. The original IP packet is inserted between
the ESP header and the ESP trailer. The inner IP packet is encrypted while
the complete ESP packet is authenticated.
3) Core Components: We describe the core components of
IPsec implementations that are part of hosts or gateways. The
Security Policy Database (SPD) holds security policies that
decide on traffic protection using IPsec. Entries have match
keys, e.g., IP src/dst address, IP protocol, and TCP/UDP port,
with an assigned action. IPsec allows three actions: DROP
(discard packet), BYPASS (no protection), and PROTECT
(apply IPsec protection). In case the table yields no match,
the DROP action is applied. SPD entries for IPsec connections
point to the protocol (AH/ESP), the operation mode (trans-
port/tunnel), and the cipher suite. An IPsec tunnel between two
peers is described by two unidirectional security associations
(SAs). An IPsec SA contains all required data for AH/ESP
processing, e.g., cipher keys, valid sequence numbers, or SA
lifetimes for rekeying and tear down. SAs are part of the
Security Association Database (SAD). With the information
from the SAD, packets then can be processed by ESP/AH
processing. Although manual configuration of SA is possible,
SAs are typically configured between IPsec peers with the
help of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [8] that
was introduced with IPsec. It authenticates both peers, sets up
a secure channel for key exchange, and negotiates SAs. Today,
its successor Internet Key Exchange v2 (IKEv2) [9] should be
used. It is less complex and solves incompatibility issues of
IKE. IKE relies on the Peer Authentication Database (PAD)
for authentication other IPsec peers.
4) Packet Processing: IPsec differentiates between ingress
and egress processing of packets. Figure 3 depicts ingress
processing. Arriving packets that have an ESP/AH header are
processed with the help of the SAD. If the SAD has an entry
for the corresponding SA, the SA data is forwarded to the
ESP/AH processing function that removes IPsec protection.
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Fig. 2. IPsec packet processing between two IPsec peers. Each peer features
a SPD, SAD, PAD, and AH/ESP processing functions on the data plane. The
SPD and PAD are configured manually where SAD entries are managed by
the IKE daemon.
Afterwards, the packet is forwarded to default network pro-
cessing.
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Fig. 3. IPsec ingress processing. Arriving packets with an ESP/AH header
are processed with the help of the SAD. ESP/AH processing relies on data
in the SAD. In case of no match, the packet is dropped.
Figure 4 depicts egress processing where IP packets are
matched with SPD entries as explained before. In case of
PROTECT, data for ESP/AH processing is selected from the
SAD. If the SAD has no matching entry, SA setup is requested
from the IKE daemon.
IKE
SPD
SAD
DISCARD
PROTECT
BYPASS
ESP/AH 
processing
IP 
forwarding
No entry 
in SAD
Drop packet
IP
packet
Fig. 4. IPsec egress processing. The SAD matches packets and maps them
to the actions DISCARD, BYPASS, and PROTECT. In case of BYPASS, the
packet is passed to IP forwarding. In case of PROTECT, the SAD is searched
for a corresponding entry for ESP/AH processing. In case of no match, the
packet is dropped.
5) Discussion: Among more recent alternatives such as
OpenVPN and WireGuard, IPsec is still one of the most
widespread VPN mechanisms nowadays. IPsec implementa-
tions are part of common operating systems for computers,
servers, and mobile devices for many years. Most network
hardware appliances, e.g., firewalls, routers, or security appli-
ances, include an IPsec implementation.
However, IPsec is highly criticized for its complexity for
many years. The most encompassing analysis was performed
by Ferguson and Schneier [10] in 2003. The authors mainly
criticized the redundancy of functionality caused by AH, ESP,
and the two operation modes, the complex key exchange with
IKE, and the complex configuration caused by the SPD and
SAD. However, those issues can be easily solved. Transport
mode and AH should be avoided. Instead, AE ciphers that
combine encryption and authentication should be used in
conjunction with ESP with tunnel mode. IKE should be
substituted by a less complex protocol for key exchange. In
P4-IPsec, we follow those recommendations and restrict the
IPsec implementation to ESP in tunnel mode with controller-
based SA management without IKE.
B. Data Plane Programming with P4
SDN introduces network programability by shifting control-
plane functions to a software-based controller that deter-
mines the packet processing behaviour of network devices.
OpenFlow (OF) [11] is the most widely-used SDN approach.
It relies on data plane devices with a fixed set of func-
tions and a southbound interface to the SDN controller. The
SDN controller defines how these functions are applied to
network packets. Programmable data planes extend network
programmability to data plane functionality. Packet processing
can be defined on an abstract layer using a dedicated pro-
gramming language. Thereby, packet processing behavior is
decoupled from the underlying hardware. This new principle
facilitates open network research with support for agile devel-
opment processes and flexible deployment options. Bifulco et
al. [12] give an overview on programmable data planes. Target
platforms include software targets, network interface cards
(NICs), NICs with a field programmable gate array (FPGA)
unit, and hardware appliances with network processing units
(NPUs). P4 is the most widely-used data plane programming
language nowadays. Initially presented as a research paper in
2014, the project is now standardized by the P4 Language
Consortium under the Open Network Foundation (ONF). Its
latest specification is version 16 (P416) [13].
1) Processing Pipeline: Figure 5 depicts a simplified view
on the packet processing pipeline of P4. It consists of three
core abstractions that help to express forwarding behavior.
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Fig. 5. Simplified view on the P4 processing pipeline of P416. It comprises
the parser, control blocks, and the deparser. Each control block may include
MATs, actions, and externs.
a) Parser: The parser extracts header fields of packets
into internal data structures. P4 does not include predefined
header types, i.e., programmers need to define packet formats
and extraction behavior. Packet header formats are defined
using P4 header types such as fixed- and variable-length bit
strings or integers. The extraction behavior of the parser is
expressed as finite state machine (FSM). Parsing is initiated
in the state start, possible outcome states are accept (proceed
in packet processing) and reject (drop the packet). Custom
states that are positioned between start and ending states
implement the extraction of header data. Transitions between
those states are formulated using conditions. For example, after
successfully parsing an IP header, state transitions to TCP or
UDP parsing might follow.
b) Control Blocks: Control blocks are functions that
modify packet headers and metadata. The P4 processing
pipeline can include multiple control blocks that are typically
separated by a queue or buffer. Packet processing in control
blocks is stateless: the outcome of packet processing applied
to one packet can not influence packet processing applied on a
subsequent packet. Actual packet processing is implemented in
actions, code fragments within control blocks that implement
read/write operations with functions provided by P4, e.g.,
setting header fields or adding/removing headers. Actions can
be called from other actions, explicitly with the start of the
control block, or implicitly by MATs. MATs map match keys to
particular actions with associated parameters. When applying
a MAT to packets, header and metadata is matched in exact,
ternary, or in longest prefix manner against the keys of the
MAT. If matching yields a particular row entry, the specified
action is called with the associated parameters. If there is no
match, a default action is applied. P4 programs only contain
the declaration of MATs, their entries are maintained by a
control plane via an application programming interface (API)
in runtime. Some targets may provide additional functions for
packet processing, e.g., particular functions such as checksum
generation, or stateful components such as counters, meters,
and registers. These components can be used within P4
programs as so-called externs. Externs have an interface with
defined instantiation methods, functions, and parameters. After
import and declaration, they can be used in control blocks just
like any other P4 function.
c) Deparser: The deparser reassembles the packet header
and payload and serializes it to be sent out via an egress port.
2) Deployment Model: Software or hardware platforms that
execute P4 programs are called P4 targets. Common software
targets are the BMv2 [14] software target, eBPF packet filters,
and the T4P4S [15] software target that includes hardware
interfaces via Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) [16] and
Open Data Plane (ODP) [17]. Hardware targets include FPGA-
based targets and NICs, NPU-based NICs, and whitebox
switches featuring the Tofino application-specific integrated
circuit (ASIC) from Barefoot Networks. P4 programs are im-
plemented for a particular P4 architecture. P4 architectures can
be seen as programming models that represent the logical view
of a P4 processing pipeline. They serve as intermediate layer
to decouple P4 programs from P4 targets, i.e., P4 programs
that are implemented for a particular P4 architecture can be
deployed to all P4 targets that implement this architecture.
A front-end compiler translates P4 programs into a target-
independent high-level intermediate representation (HLIR).
Afterwards, the HLIR is compiled to the particular target using
a back-end compiler that is provided by the manufacturer.
3) Control Plane API: P4Runtime: The runtime behavior
of P4 targets can be controlled by managing MATs or stateful
components (e.g., counter, meters, registers, or externs) that
are part of the P4 program. P4Runtime API [18] is a target-
and program-independent API standardized by the P4 lan-
guage consortium. P4Runtime uses gRPC for communication
between the control plane and P4 targets and protobuf [19]
data structures for packet serialization/parsing. gRPC connec-
tions can be secured with Transport Layer Security (TLS)
and mutual authentication with certificates. In P4Runtime,
the SDN controller establishes gRPC connections to pre-
configured targets. P4Runtime supports P4 object access (e.g.,
on MATs and externs), session management (master/slave
controllers), role-based access control, and a packet-in/-out
mechanism to receive and send out packets via controllers. The
PI Library is the reference implementation of the P4Runtime
server that is part of P4 targets. It implements generic func-
tionality for internal P4 objects such as MATs. This func-
tionality can be extended by target- or architecture-specific
configuration objects. p4runtime_lib [20] is an exemplary
implementation of the P4Runtime API in Python to be used for
building controllers. P4Runtime API plugins are also available
for common SDN controllers such as ONOS or OpenDaylight.
4) Application Domains: Most research works on P4-based
network applications target data center or wide area networks.
In traffic management and congestion control, P4 is leveraged
to implement new congestion notification mechanisms, novel
traffic scheduling mechanisms, or novel mechanisms for active
queue management. In routing and forwarding, special rout-
ing and forwarding mechanisms, publish-subscribe systems,
or novel concepts from the area of named data networks
are implemented. A large focus also lies on monitoring,
where several works implement monitoring systems, sketch-
based monitoring mechanisms, and in-band network telemetry
(INT) systems. Besides, P4 is used in data center scenarios
to implement switching, load balancing, Network Function
Virtualization (NFV), and Service Function Chaining (SFC)
mechanisms.
III. RELATED WORK
We describe related work on network security applications
built with P4, IPsec in SDN, and implementation of IPsec
packet processing.
A. Network Security Applications with P4
Although network security is not the prevalent application
domain of P4, some scientific work has been published in this
field. We describe related work on firewalls, DDoS mitigation
mechanisms, and other security applications.
1) Firewalls: Vörös and Kiss [21] introduce a P4-based
firewall for filtering IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP packets.
It includes a ban list for instant drop, counters, e.g., for
measuring the packet rate or unsuccessful connection attempts,
and MATs for applying whitelist firewall rules. P4Guard [22]
follows a similar approach. Its authors focus on simplified
updated processes by deploying re-compiled versions of the
P4 program. Ricart-Sanchez et al. [23] implement a P4-based
firewall for 5G networks. It includes parser definitions for
filtering GPRS tunneling protocol (GTP) data. CoFilter [24]
introduces a hash function for efficient flow identification. It
is built as P4 action and uses hashes instead of 5-tuples for
flow identification to save table space. Including the function
directly on the packet processing devices keeps latency low.
Zaballa et al. [25] and Almaini et al. [26] introduce port
knocking on P4 switches.
2) DDoS Mitigation Mechanisms: Paolucci et al. [27],
[28] propose a DDoS mitigation mechanism that runs on P4
switches. A stateful mechanism detects and blocks DDoS port
scan attacks with incremental TCP and UDP destination port
numbers. Dimolianis et al. [29] also implement a DDoS attack
mitigation mechanism that runs completely on P4 switches.
Collected flow data is mapped to distinct time intervals where
DDoS attacks are detected by analyzing the symmetry ratio of
incoming and outgoing traffic. TDoSD@DP [30] implements
a mitigation scheme against DDoS attacks on SIP proxies.
The authors introduce a simple state machine that monitors
SIP message sequences. Valid sequences of INVITE and BYE
messages keep the port open. Febro et al. [31] implement
another DDoS mitigation mechanism for SIP INVITE DDoS
attacks. P4 switches keep per-port counters for INVITE or
REGISTER packets that are monitored by an SDN controller
to detect DDoS attacks. LAMP [32] implements cooperative
mitigation of application layer DDoS attacks via in-band sig-
naling with P4. Afek et al. [33] implement known mitigation
mechanisms for SYN and DNS spoofing in DDoS attacks in
P4. Lapolli et al. [34] describe a novel algorithmic approach
based on the Shannon entropy to detect and stop DDoS attacks
on P4 switches. Kuka et al. [35] introduce an FPGA-based
system for DDoS attack mitigation. P4 is used to extract header
data from packets and send it to an SDN controller where
DDoS attack identification is implemented. Mi and Wang [36]
propose a similar approach where collected data is sent to a
deep learning module that runs on a server in the network.
3) Other Security Applications: Lewis et al. [37] implement
an IDS offloading mechanism in P4. A rule parser translates
Snort IDS rules into MAT entries for a P4 switch. Then,
IDS pipeline stages decide if packets should be forwarded,
dropped, or sent to an external IDS for analysis. Poise [38]
is a security-related network control system that translates
high-level policies into P4 programs for network control. In
P4-MACsec [2], we implement IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec) in
P4 and introduce an automated deployment that relies on
link monitoring and MACsec provisioning. Link monitoring
is implemented using a novel variant of Link Layer Discovery
Protocol (LLDP) that relies on encrypted payloads and se-
quence numbers to protect against LLDP packet manipulations
and replay attacks.
B. IPsec in SDN
Several works investigate the application of SDN to IPsec
operation. We describe operation modes, southbound inter-
faces, and use cases.
1) Operation Modes: Related work can be categorized by
three different operation modes that are depicted in Figure 6.
a) IPsec Node with IKE: In the first operation mode,
IPsec processing nodes feature an IKE daemon, SDN assists
in preconfiguration. Aragon et al. [39], [40] propose that
an SDN controller pre-configures authentication keys in the
PAD. Carrel and Weiss [41] propose that an SDN controller
distributes Diffie-Hellman public values to all associated IPsec
data plane nodes. Guo et al. [42] propose a similar approach
that is compatible to older IKE daemons that only support
IKEv1. Lopez-Millan et al. [43] propose an "IKE mode" where
the SDN controller only provides information for configuration
of SPD, PAD, and IKE daemon. All proposals aim to reduce
the message exchanges in an IKE process by preconfiguring
it by a controller.
b) IKE on the Controller: In the second operation mode,
the IKE daemon is part of a SDN control plan. Son et al.
[44] relocate the IKE daemon to the control plane. There,
it performs key exchange with peers and manages the SAD
of the IPsec data plane nodes. This approach even supports
migration schemes so that the SA can be transferred to other
IPsec data plane nodes, e.g., in fail-over or load-balancing
operations. Vajaranta et al. [45] describe a similar approach
where IKE is executed as network function that can be scaled
up by creating additional instances.
c) IKE-less Operation: In the third operation mode, SAs
are maintained without IKE. Lopez-Millan et al. [43] describe
an "IKE-less" operation mode where the SA maintenance
is delegated to an SDN controller. Here, the IPsec element
only implements IPsec logic where the complete key manage-
ment logic is moved to the SDN controller. As there is no
IKE, no PAD is required. The authors differentiate between
a proactive mode, where SPD and SAD are preconfigured
by the SDN controller and reactive mode, where only the
SPD is preconfigured by the SDN controller. Several works
[39], [46]–[48] propose SA management without IKE. The
controller generates keying material and sets up SAs in the
SAD of associated IPsec data plane nodes. Gunleifsen et
al. [49] introduce a key management server that creates and
distributes IPsec SAs for encryption virtual network functions
(VNFs). In consecutive works, Gunleifsen et al. [50], [51]
name this concept as "Software-Defined Security Associations
(SD-SAs)". Encryption VNFs only perform IPsec processing.
SAs are created and distributed by an authentication center.
2) Discussion on Operation Modes: We briefly discuss
benefits and drawbacks of the three operation modes. The first
operation mode benefits from easy migration. As legacy IPsec
devices already feature an IKE daemon, they can be easily
extended by an interface to profit from SDN-assisted operation
of IPsec (see [43]). The second operation mode especially in-
troduces flexibility and scalability. Separating IPsec processing
and SA establishing to different entities improves scalability
(see [45]). The third operation mode removes the overhead of
peer-to-peer key exchange with IKE. On the one hand, this
might be unnecessary in environments where both IPsec peers
are controlled by an SDN controller. On the other hand, IKE
requires that IKE connectivity of both peers which could be
not given in particular scenarios (see [51]). Lopez-Millan et al.
[43] show in an analytical evaluation that IKE-based and IKE-
less operation of IPsec have the approximately same process
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Fig. 6. Operation Modes for Data Plane Management of IPsec. In (a), IKE
is part of the IPsec node. In (b), IKE is part of the control plane. In (c), IKE
is substituted by controller-based SA management.
load in terms of messages and configuration data exchange.
3) Southbound Protocols: On legacy network devices that
feature IPsec devices, SNMP (e.g., [52]) is used for basic
configuration and monitoring. The authors of [42] extend this
usage in making an IKE daemon manageable by SNMP as
well. In [53], SSH is used as southbound interface to manage
and monitor IPsec data plane nodes. The work in [46] uses
NETCONF with YANG configuration models. In addition to
the southbound protocol, they consider east-/westbound inter-
faces for controller-to-controller communication via different
domains. Aragon et al. [39] used OAuth 2.0 to deliver config-
uration data within authorization messages. In [47], OpenFlow
(OF) is extended using experimenter messages. The work in
[48] leverages BGP. Li and Mao [54] use a custom southbound
protocol to interface an IPsec extension module on an Open
vSwitch. The authors of [55] propose a custom southbound
protocol with notification, configuration, and query messages
that are transmitted via TCP or TLS. Lopez-Millan et al. [43]
use NETCONF with YANG models as southbound protocol.
Gunleifsen et al. [50], [51] use REST with JSON.
4) Use Cases: Use cases that benefit from controller-based
operation of IPsec are SD-WAN, cloud provider networks, and
dynamic VPN setup.
a) SD-WAN: Large organizations with distributed loca-
tions require network connectivity between the different sites.
As dedicated links are expensive, site-to-site IPsec-VPNs over
provider networks are increasingly used. However, manually
setting up VPN connections between all branches is time-
intensive and complex. SD-WAN [42], [53], [54] proposes
IPsec data plane functionality as part of hardware appliances
or software modules at the perimeter of the different sites of
the organization. Then, a centralized controller automatically
sets up and maintains IPsec-VPN connections.
b) Cloud Provider Networks: Often, internal services of-
fered by a public or private cloud provider need to be accessed
from within networks of an organization. Again, site-to-site
IPsec-VPN tunnels are a cost-efficient alternative to dedicated
links. Administrators define IPsec-VPN gateways via a cloud
management interface. Then, the cloud orchestrator deploys
IPsec-VPN gateways as virtual network function on the cloud
provider’s infrastructure. Its runtime operation is managed by a
controller. In addition, controller-based operation of IPsec can
be also used to dynamically connect different cloud networks
by a multi-cloud orchestrator [56]. Gunleifsen et al. [49],
[50] propose hop-by-hop protection for SFCs using IPsec and
controller-based operation.
c) Dynamic VPN Setup: Managing many IPsec-VPN
connections to different hosts or services on a client host can
be cumbersome. Dynamic VPN setup performed by a con-
troller takes over the tasks of tunnel setup and management.
Van der Pol et al. [57] present a concept where users request
VPN access to a particular network device from the controller.
It then automatically sets up a VPN tunnel to the remote
domain. Aragon et al. [39] combine dynamic VPN setup with
authentication and authorization to automatically deploy IPsec-
VPN tunnels between IoT network devices. This introduces
several advantages over traditional deployment. First, the con-
trol plane has an encompassing view on the network topology
with all devices. It can monitor usage and detect outages
for reliable operation. Second, the centralized control plane
features northbound interfaces for management applications
and southbound interfaces for controlling data plane devices.
Instead of manual per-device configuration, VPNs are operated
via a management layer with policy languages that allow rule
validation. Last, the centralized control plane offers flexibility
so that VPN operation can be extended by other mechanisms,
e.g., user authentication with 802.1X [54].
C. Implementation of IPsec Packet Processing
With P4-IPsec, we present the first data plane implementa-
tion of IPsec in P4. We give an overview on IPsec data plane
implementations as related work.
1) Software Implementations with Hardware Acceleration:
IPsec software programs represent the most simple packet
processing implementations. Their I/O performance depends
on the hardware, the chosen cryptographic algorithms, and
the average packet size. For Linux host systems, optimization
techniques such as DPDK [16], Netmap [58], and PF_RING
[59] tweak network stack processing to increase packet I/O
rates. Other works propose to increase IPsec packet I/O by
using multiple CPU cores [60], [61] or the GPU [62]. Gallen-
müller et al. [63] compare several mechanisms in an extensive
study. Most of the described optimization mechanisms are only
applicable to Linux operating systems.
IPsec packet I/O of software implementations can be im-
proved by offloading crypto operations or IPsec operations to
hardware. For the former, current CPU architectures provide
hardware acceleration for common crypto operations. AES-NI
[64] or ARMv8 Cryptographic Extensions [65] are examples
of AES instruction sets that replace pure software implemen-
tations. System on chip (SoC) platforms or circuit boards
may contain chips for offloading cryptographic processing.
Examples are the Marvell Cryptographic Engines Security
Accelerator (CESA) or Intel QuickAssist [66]. Such processors
can be also part of extension circuit boards that are connected
to the mainboard via PCI. FPGAs might be also used for
implementing crypto operations, several vendors (e.g., [67])
supply implementations of cryptographic algorithms as pro-
gram cores. For the latter, IPsec hardware accellerators are
available as ASIC [68], [69], NPU [70], [71], accellerated
processing unit (APU) [72], or FPGA [73], [74].
2) Hardware Implementations: Proprietary IPsec hardware
concentrators, e.g., as sold by Cisco or Juniper, are optimized
for high IPsec I/O rates and, therefore, might implement a
larger degree of the overall IPsec processing operations in
hardware (e.g., ASICs). Due to their disclosed architectural
details, we cannot get insight into technical details. In addition,
encompassing IPsec implementations for FPGAs exist [75],
[76] where only SPD and SAD are managed by an SDN
controller.
3) Implementations on Programmable Data Planes: For
programmable data planes, in 2016, a Xilinx employee re-
ported on the P4-Development mailing list [77] that IPsec was
successfully implemented in PX [78], a high-level domain-
specific programming language for programmable data planes.
Crypto primitives are not expressed in the language, but by
an extern mechanism similar to P4’s externs. The authors
report that the crypto primitives were programmed as Register
Transfer Level (RTL) designs targeting FPGAs. The authors
report that the principle should be exactly the same for P4,
but it was not ported so far.
IV. CONCEPT
We describe the concept of P4-IPsec. We give an overview,
discuss design choices, and describe its data plane and control
plane in detail.
A. Overview
Figure 7 gives an overview on the functionality of P4-IPsec.
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Fig. 7. Overview on the functionality of P4-IPsec. In host-to-site operation,
roadwarrior hosts run a client agent to setup an IPsec tunnel to a P4 switch
via the SDN controller. In site-to-site operation, the SDN controller sets up
IPsec tunnels on pairs of P4 switches.
P4-IPsec supports two IPsec tunnel operation modes: host-
to-site and site-to-site. In host-to-site mode, roadwarrior hosts
establish IPsec tunnels to access internal networks. Roadwar-
rior hosts run a client agent that interacts with the controller
for tunnel setup. In site-to-site mode, two internal networks are
connected via an IPsec tunnel that is established between two
P4 switches. As core principle of P4-IPsec, every P4 switch
implements the same IPsec functionalities, i.e., it can act as
both, IPsec tunnel endpoint for roadwarrior hosts in host-to-
site mode and for other P4 switches in site-to-site mode. This
facilitates very flexible deployments where IPsec tunnels do
not necessarily terminate at a central VPN concentrator but
can be distributed to many P4 switches instead.
B. Design Choices
P4 programs describe the packet forwarding behavior of
switches or routers. Thereby, an implementation of IPsec in P4
is limited to data plane centric parts. Additional mechanisms
such as IKE need to be part of an SDN controller imple-
menting the control plane and interfacing the P4 program. For
P4-IPsec, our adoption of IPsec in P4, we make the following
design choices:
1) Use of IKE-less Operation Mode: Refering to the results
of Lopez-Millan et al. [43] (see Section III-B1), we choose
to implement SA management via the SDN controller without
IKE. Our proposed P4 processing pipeline comprise equivalent
representations for the SAD and SPD that are both maintained
by the SDN controller. Due to the lack of IKE, no PAD is
required on the P4 processing pipeline. Selecting IKE-less
operation mode does not exclude an integration of IKE on
the SDN controller at a later stage.
2) Restriction to ESP in Tunnel Mode: To keep our pro-
posed concept as minimalistic as possible, we adopt the
recommendations of Ferguson and Schneier [10] and restrict
our implementation to ESP in tunnel mode.
3) Implementation of Cipher Suites with Externs: P4 does
not provide functions for encryption, decryption, and message
authentication. In contrast to related work, we decide against
offloading IPsec processing to external, software-based pro-
cessing nodes and implement cipher suites with the help of P4
externs (see Section II-B). This should decrease the latency
introduced by external processing while keeping the overall
system more minimalistic. Each cipher suite is implemented
by two externs; one that implements encryption functionality,
and one that implements decryption functionality.
4) Prototype Simplifications: We limit P4-IPsec to IPv4 and
omit support for IPv6. We also omit support for IPComp.
For applicability in experiments, we implement simple L3
forwarding based on longest-prefix matching (LPM). Clearly,
this is not a requirement from the IPsec standard.
C. Data Plane of P4-IPsec
We first give an overview on the P4 processing pipeline
of P4-IPsec. For the sake of simplicity in presentation, we
combine functions into function blocks and describe them in
detail.
1) P4 Processing Pipeline: Figure 8 depicts the P4 packet
processing pipeline of P4-IPsec. It consists of a parser, de-
parser, and four function blocks in between. When a packet
arrives via the ingress, the P4 parser first extracts the packet
headers. In case of a header other than ESP, the parser for-
wards the packet to optional higher-layer functions that operate
on protocol layers such as TCP or UDP. Afterwards, the
SPD matching function block processes the packet. Following
the IPsec standard, entries in the SPD determine about the
action to be executed on the packet. In case of DISCARD, the
packet is dropped. In case of BYPASS, the packet is passed
to the L3 forwarding function block. In case of PROTECT,
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Fig. 8. Data plane processing pipeline of P4-IPsec. For ease of understanding, related functionalities are grouped together as function block.
the packet is passed to the ESP encrypt function block. In the
ESP encrypt control block, encryption using SA data from the
SADenc MAT is applied to the IP packet. In the L3 forwarding
control block, the packet is forwarded based on rules defined
in the forwarding MAT. Going back to the parser again: if
the packet has an ESP header, it is forwarded to the ESP
decryption control block. It validates the packet’s authenticity,
decrypts the ESP message, and extracts the original IP packet
that is then passed to the L3 forwarding control block. In
case of missing entries in the SPD, SADdec, SADenc, or LPM-
FWD MAT, the packet is dropped. As final step, the deparser
reassembles all headers and re-calculates the IPv4 checksum
as some fields, e.g., the TTL, are changed. Runtime behavior
of the data plane can be managed by manipulating the MATs
via an SDN controller.
2) Function Block: L3 Forwarding: Figure 9 depicts the
function block of L3 forwarding. It implements packet for-
warding to the next hop via a particular output port of the
P4 switch. The LPM-FWD MAT matches packets using their
IPv4 destination addresses to two actions: forward_packet and
drop. The forward_packet action receives the MAC address of
the next hop and the output port as parameters from the MAT.
Then, it sets the MAC destination address of the packet to the
MAC address of the next hop, decreases the time to live (TTL)
by 1 in the IP header, and sets the output port. Afterwards,
the packet is forwarded to the deparser and sent out via the
egress. drop directly discards the packet; this action is also
applied if no match in the LPM-FWD MAT is found.
3) Function Block: SPD Matching: Figure 10 depicts the
function block of SPD matching. We introduce a security
policy (SP) MAT that resembles the SPD from the IPsec
standard (see Section II-A). It matches given packets with SPD
rules and adds a mark to the user metadata of each packet that
is used in further processing within the P4 processing pipeline.
We implement IPv4 source and destination address and IP
protocol as exemplary match keys. Due to P4’s flexibility in
defining packet parsers and parsing packets, more match keys,
e.g., for TCP/UDP ports or even application-layer ports could
be added easily. Actions are either add_spd_mark or drop.
The add_spd_mark action adds "spd_mark = 1" for BYPASS
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Fig. 9. L3 forwarding function block. IP packets are processed by the LPM-
FWD MAT that either applies the forward_packet or drop action. In case of
no match, the drop action is applied.
or "spd_mark = 2" for PROTECT to the user metadata field
of the packet. drop directly discards the packet; this action is
also applied if no match is found.
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Fig. 10. SPD matching function block. IP packets are processed by the SPD
MAT. The add_spd_mark action adds the given parameter to the user metadata
of the packet. It decides if the packet is protected by IPsec (PROTECT) or
forwarded without protection (BYPASS) in later stages.
4) Function Block: ESP Encryption: Figure 11 depicts the
function block of ESP encryption. We introduce a SAD-ENC
MAT that resembles the SAD from the IPsec standard (see
Section II-A). Each entry in the MAT represents a particular
SA that is identified by the IPv4 destination address, i.e.,
packets are matched based on their IPv4 destination address.
We implement cipher suites as actions that rely on externs
and registers. Representing a variety of cipher suites, we
implement the AES-CTR and NULL cipher suite as examples.
The NULL cipher suite is intended for testing purposes only.
It uses the identity function instead of encrypting data and
skips calculating an integrity check value. Cipher suite actions
receive two types of parameters: basic parameters that are
required by all cipher suites and cipher-specific parameters.
We first describe the basic parameters. The Security Pa-
rameter Index (SPI) is part of the ESP header. It identifies the
SA. The tunnel endpoint addresses (IPv4 source/destination
address) identify the source and destination of the IPsec tunnel.
Both are part of the new outer IPv4 header that encapsulates
the ESP frame. The register index points to a particular index
that holds the packet counter for the particular SA used by the
cipher suite extern. Packet limits declare timeout conditions
in terms of packet count thresholds for SAs. If a soft limit
is reached, rekeying is triggered. If a hard limit is reached,
packets that belong to that SA are dropped.
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Fig. 11. ESP encryption function block. IP packets are processed by the SAD-
ENC MAT. It holds entries for each SA with the corresponding data that is
required for applying the associated cipher suite externs for encryption.
The NULL cipher suite is an example that only requires this
set of basic parameters. Typical cipher suites that implement
particular encryption and authentication mechanisms require
additional parameters such as keys, initialization vectors (IVs),
or even additional constructs to keep cipher state, e.g., regis-
ters. AES-CTR, as example for such a cipher suite, requires a
key for AES and a key for HMAC.
The functionality within the cipher suite action is as follows.
First, the packet counter for the particular SA is read from the
register and incremented. Second, an ESP header is created
with the SPI and sequence number of the packet. For the
creation of the ESP packet, the action passes the original IP
packet, the newly created ESP header, and required keys of
the cipher suite to the corresponding extern. The cipher suite
extern performs encryption/authentication and responds with
the ESP packet. Fourth, the new outer IP packet is created
with the tunnel endpoint addresses. It encapsulates the newly
created ESP packet. Last, timeout conditions are checked. The
user metadata structure includes flags for soft_limit_reached
and hard_limit_reached that are set in case of matching
conditions.
5) Function Block: ESP Decryption: Figure 12 depicts the
function block of ESP decryption. We introduce the SAD-
DEC MAT that resembles the decryption SAD from the IPsec
standard (see Section II-A). Each entry in the MAT represents
a particular SA that is identified by the outer IPv4 source
address and IPv4 destination address (tunnel endpoints), and
the SPI. As in the function block of ESP Encryption, cipher
suites are implemented as actions that rely on externs and
registers with a different set of action parameters.
The functionality within the cipher suite action is as follows.
First, the packet counter for the particular SA is read from the
register and incremented. Second, the original IP packet is
extracted from the ESP packet. Therefore, the action passes
the ESP packet and the required keys of the cipher suite to
the corresponding extern. The cipher suite extern performs
decryption/authentication and responds with the original IP
packet. Last, timeout conditions are checked as described in
ESP encryption.
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Fig. 12. ESP decryption function block. ESP packets are processed by a SAD-
DEC MAT. It holds entries for each SA with the corresponding data that is
required for applying the associated cipher suite externs for decryption.
D. Control Plane Operation of P4-IPsec
We first give an overview on the control plane operation of
P4-IPsec. We describe how configuration data is generated on
the controller and how it is set up in both, host-to-site and
site-to-site operation mode.
1) Overview: Figure 13 depicts the control plane inter-
action in the two operation modes of P4-IPsec, host-to-site
and site-to-site mode. In both operation modes, IPsec tunnels
are set up by the controller on the basis of IPsec tunnel
profiles. Those can be manually defined by an administrator
or generated by another software component, e.g., a network
operation platform. In host-to-site operation mode, the SDN
controller interacts with the client agent via a gRPC tunnel and
with the P4 switch via P4Runtime. In site-to-site operation
mode, the SDN controller interacts with both P4 switches
via P4Runtime. On roadwarrior hosts, configuration data is
converted into ip xfrm commands that set up the tunnel.
For P4 switches, the controller directly writes to MATs and
receives notifications, e.g., if an SA needs to be renewed,
via P4Runtime. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our
implementation to proactive IPsec tunnel setup. In site-to-site
mode, IPsec tunnels are set up and kept alive for all configured
P4 switches. For host-to-site mode, the client agent presents a
selection of available tunnels. The user then can select one or
multiple IPsec tunnel profiles to be set up by the controller.
P4
switch
P4
switch
Roadwarrior 
host
Site A Site B
SDN controller
P4Runtime P4Runtime
gRPC
IPsec tunnel 
profile
IPsec IPsec
Client 
agent
Fig. 13. Control plane operation in P4-IPsec. The client agent on the
roadwarrior host holds a control channel via gRPC to the SDN controller. P4
switches are connected via P4Runtime. The SDN controller includes IPsec
tunnel profiles with configuration data for tunnel setup and management.
This mechanism can be extended or substituted by more
sophisticated approaches such as on-demand VPN setup. Pre-
defined conditions (e.g., a request for a network resource in
an internal network) may trigger IPsec tunnel setup via the
controller.
2) IPsec Tunnel Profiles: An IPsec tunnel between two
peers consists of two unidirectional SAs, each identified by
a unique SPI. Due to their direction, the first peer of an SA is
called "left" where the second peer of the SA is called "right".
We denote the SA from the left to the right peer as SPIi and
the SA from the right to the left peer as SPIj, respectively.
Each SA requires two MAT entries: one for encrypting ESP
packets in the SAD-ENC MAT and one for decrypting ESP
packets in the SAD-DEC MAT.
Figure 14 depicts how the SDN controller generates con-
figuration data for the roadwarrior hosts or P4 switches. IPsec
tunnel profiles are the basis for any IPsec tunnel. As basic
information about the tunnel, it includes information about
the type of IPsec tunnel (host-to-site or site-to-site) and the
allowed traffic that is set to PROTECTED via SPD rules. The
left peer (first) can be a P4 switch (in site-to-site operation
mode) or a roadwarrior host (in host-to-site operation mode).
In case of site-to-site operation mode, this field holds the
switch ID (unique identifier of the P4 switch), endpoint IP
(public IP address of the P4 switch), and network resource
(internal network behind the P4 switch). In case of host-to-site
operation mode, this field only holds the roadwarrior ID. The
right peer (second) is always a P4 switch. Therefore, it holds
the same data as in the left peer field in site-to-site operation
mode as described before. The SA field holds the cipher suite
and soft/hard packet limits. On the basis of an IPsec tunnel
profile, the controller generates configuration data for both
SAs. In case of the AES-CTR-HMAC-MD5 cipher suite, SA
data inludes keys for AES-CTR and HMAC, register indexes,
and configuration data for the SPD and forwarding function
block. In case of the NULL cipher suite, keying material is
not needed.
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Fig. 14. IPsec tunnel profiles with the associated SA data generated by the
SDN controller. Configuration data in the IPsec tunnel profiles depends on the
operation mode (host-to-site or site-to-site). SA data depends on the cipher
suite that is defined in the IPsec tunnel profile.
In our prototype, IPsec tunnel profiles are manually defined
by an administrator. In practice, they can be generated by a
software component, e.g., a network operation platform, on
the basis of user/device profiles, groups, network resources,
and permission models.
3) Controller Connection: We describe the management
connections in site-to-site and host-to-site operation mode.
a) Site-to-Site (P4Runtime): Site-to-site mode relies on
P4Runtime for managing the P4 switches. Explained in Sec-
tion II-B3, the control plane connection to the P4 switches is
established by the SDN controller. Therefore, it holds a list of
connection data (name, address, port identity) of all assigned
P4 switches.
b) Host-to-Site (gRPC): Figure 15 depicts the connection
between the client agent running on the roadwarrior host and
the SDN controller. Required configuration data for the start of
the client agent are the FQDN of the controller and the client
certificate. At start, the client agents establishes a gRPC tunnel
to the SDN controller. The gRPC tunnel is protected with
SSL/TLS, i.e., the client agent and SDN controller perform
a mutual authentication using certificates and establish an
encrypted connection. Certificates can be created and deployed
to all roadwarrior hosts running the client agent and the SDN
controller with a public key infrastructure (PKI). Roadwarrior
host access can be removed by simply revoking the asso-
ciated client certificate. In addition, gRPC provides support
for optional multi-factor authentication (MFA) with token-
based authentication via the Google Authenticator service.
After connection setup, the client agent and SDN controller
exchange configuration and signaling data via the gRPC tun-
nel. The client agent implements interfaces to interact with
the roadwarrior host’s operating system for configuration and
signaling. Control plane connection to the P4 switch as remote
peer is established with P4Runtime as described before.
Host-to-site operation mode requires that the controller is
dual-homed. It has an interface to a management network
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Fig. 15. Control plane connection between the client agent and SDN
controller. The client agent depends on the FQDN of the controller and a
client certificate to establish a gRPC connection to the SDN controller.
where it holds P4Runtime connections to the P4 switches
and another interface that makes it accessible via the Internet
for client agents running on roadwarrior hosts. On the latter
interface, it has an IP address that is publically reachable via
the Internet. Although mutual certificate-based authentication
protects against malicious P4-IPsec agents, this public inter-
face should be protected as every publically available web
service, e.g., with a firewall.
4) Tunnel Management Operations: We describe the ele-
mentary operations of tunnel setup, tunnel renewal, and tunnel
deletion that apply to both operation modes.
a) Tunnel Setup: Figure 16 depicts the three-step process
of IPsec tunnel setup. First, the controller sets up both SAs in
the SAD-DEC MATs of both peers. Second, the controller sets
up both SAs in the SAD-ENC MATs of both peers. Setting
up SA entries for decryption first ensures that no ESP packets
get lost if one peer immediately starts to send ESP packets.
Last, the controller sets up the SPD and installs forwarding
rules if required.
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Fig. 16. Setup procedure for a bidirectional IPsec tunnel on two peers. The
SDN controller sets up decryption and encryption for both SAs (II) followed
by SPD and forwarding entries.
b) Tunnel Renewal: IPsec SAs have a limited lifetime,
i.e., keying material needs to be renewed on a regular basis.
Both, client agent and P4 switch notify the SDN controller
if an SA needs to be renewed. For the client agent, this
notification is triggered by the kernel implementation of IPsec
that sends expiration messages in the case that soft and
hard timeout limits are reached. For the P4 switches, this
is implemented using packet counters in registers that are
checked with each packet processing within an ESP encrypt
or decrypt function block. We adopt the principle presented
by Lopez-Millan et al. [43] that implements tunnel renewal
without risking packet loss. Figure 17 depicts the process of
IPsec tunnel renewal. When the SDN controller received the
SA expire notification, it generates a new SA that is identified
by a new SPI. Then, tunnel renewal follows the principle of
tunnel setup as described before. First, the new SA is installed
in the SAD-DEC MAT. Second, the existing SA in the SAD-
ENC MAT is replaced by the new SA via a modify operation.
Last, as it can be ensured that no packets are encrypted using
the previous SA, its entry can be removed from the SAD-DEC
MAT.
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Fig. 17. Renewal procedure for an unidirectional SA within an IPsec tunnel on
two peers. After receiving an SA expire message, the SDN controller installs
a new decryption SA on the remote peer. Afterwards, it replaces the expired
encryption SA with new SA data. As cleanup step, the old decryption SA is
removed.
c) Tunnel Deletion: If an IPsec tunnel should be deleted,
the SDN controller removes the associated entries in the SPD,
SAD-ENC, and SAD-DEC MAT. This is triggered on the SDN
controller, e.g., when an IPsec profile is removed.
V. PROTOTYPICAL IMPLEMENTATION
We describe our software-based prototype of P4-IPsec. We
outline its three parts, the P4 data plane, the client agent
running on the roadwarrior host, and the control plane imple-
mentation, in detail. We publish the implementation and our
testbed environment under the Apache v2 license on GitHub
[1].
A. Testbed Environment
Our prototypical implementation of P4-IPsec includes a
softwarized testbed environment. We use Mininet to create
network topologies that consist of BMv2 P4 switches and
network hosts. We build it with Vagrant [79], a tool that
simplifies creation and management of virtual environments.
All resources and setup steps are part of a configuration file.
Executing vagrant up in a console within the repository folder
automatically sets up and launches the testbed environment.
The testbed environment includes a virtual machine running
Ubuntu 16.04 with all dependencies: libyang, sysrepo, mininet,
protobuf, gRPC, PI/P4Runtime, BMv2, and P4C. The versions
of all components can be found in the setup scripts.
B. Data Plane Implementation
We implement the P4 data plane implementation for the
BMv2 P4 software target. We extend its simple_switch ar-
chitecture by externs programmed in C++ for the AES-CTR-
HMAC-MD5 and NULL IPsec cipher suites. Each cipher suite
is implemented by two externs, one for encryption and one for
decryption. For AES-CTR-HMAC-MD5, we use OpenSSL to
apply AES-CTR for encryption/decryption and HMAC-MD5
for packet authentication. We implement the P4 processing
pipeline as P416 program. It relies on the cipher suite externs
and uses registers to store packet counters for the SAs. We
run the P4 program on our extended simple_switch P4 target.
We encapsulate our modified simple_switch P4 target within
the simple_switch_grpc P4 target so that P4Runtime API can
be used for interaction with the SDN controller.
C. Client Agent
We implement the client agent as Python 3.6 command line
tool for Linux hosts. We integrate a gRPC client using the
gRPC library [80] as interface to the SDN controller. For IPsec
tunnel setup, the client agent translates configuration data from
the SDN controller into particular XFRM commands from the
iproute2 tool to configure IPsec on the roadwarrior host. In
addition, it sets up IP routes for routing IP traffic via the IPsec
tunnel. Received and applied configuration data is cached so
that proper teardown configuration can be applied in case of
tunnel shutdown. We implement rekeying with the help of
Netlink [81]. The client agent monitors Netlink messages by
listening on the corresponding Netlink socket and binding to
the XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE address so that XFRM Expire
messages can be received. When receiving an XFRM Expire
message, it extracts parameters such as SPI and IP addresses
of the tunnel endpoints. To initiate rekeying, the tunnel source
and destination address and SPI are put into a queue for
processing in the main class.
D. SDN Controller
We implement the controller as command line tool in
Python 2.7. We use the p4runtime_lib [20] to integrate the
interface to the P4 switch and the gRPC library to integrate
the interface to the client agent. The controller features a
simple command line interface (CLI) for development and
testing purposes that displays information about all active
IPsec tunnels. P4Runtime and p4runtime_lib facilitate easy
implementation of individual controllers for prototypes. Nev-
ertheless, those functions could be also integrated into existing
SDN controllers such as ONOS or OpenDaylight.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH THE SOFTWARE
SWITCH BMV2
We describe the test environment and report experiment
results performed with the P4-IPsec software prototype intro-
duced in Section V.
A. Methodology
We conduct the performance experiments in the testbed
environment presented in Section V-A. The testbed runs on a
Lenovo Thinkpad T480s (Intel i5-8250U CPU, 16 GB RAM)
with Manjaro Linux. The Vagrant file in the repository in-
cludes the version numbers of all software components from
the testbed environment.
Figure 18 depicts the experiment setup. S1 and S2 are BMv2
P4 switches, H1 and H2 are Linux hosts that are attached to
them. S1 and S2 are connected via two unidirectional virtual
links. We do not configure any additional delay or bandwidth
limitations on these links. Traffic between H1 and H2 is
forwarded by S1 and S2. We set up IPsec tunnels with different
cipher suites and conduct TCP goodput measurements between
H1 and H2 using iperf in version 3.7.
S1 S2
SDN controller
BYPASS
H2
IPsec (NULL)
IPsec (AES_CTR_HMAC_MD5)
H1
Fig. 18. Experiment setup for evaluation of the P4-IPsec prototype on the
BMv2 switches S1 and S2.
The results in the following represent measured average
values with confidence intervals for a significance of α = 5%.
Thus, the true averages lie within the displayed ranges with a
probability of 1− α.
B. Data Plane Evaluation
We investigate how P4-IPsec’s data plane implementation
affects the overall throughput on the BMv2 software target.
1) Experiment Description: We analyze TCP goodput for
three different configurations. In the first scenario, we install
BYPASS rules in the SPD so that traffic is only forwarded and
not handled by IPsec. In the second scenario, we establish an
IPsec tunnel between S1 and S2 with the NULL cipher suite.
In the third scenario, we establish an IPsec tunnel between S1
and S2 with the AES_CTR_HMAC_MD5 cipher suite. Each
experiment comprises 20 runs, each with a duration of 60 s
and a MTU set to 1450 B. We configure soft and hard packet
limits for rekeying to 50000 and 51000 resulting in an average
of six rekeyings per run, three for each of the two SAs of the
IPsec tunnel.
2) Results & Discussion: Figure 19(a) depicts the results.
For forwarding without IPsec (BYPASS), TCP goodput is
48.90 Mbit/s. For IPsec forwarding with the NULL cipher
suite, TCP goodput is 47.25 Mbit/s. For IPsec forwarding with
the AES_CTR_HMAC_MD5 cipher suite, TCP goodput is
47.21 Mbit/s. Hence, the experimental results show similar
TCP goodput rates between 47.21 Mbit/s and 48.90 Mbit/s for
all three scenarios. The drop in performance is caused by
IPsec processing while the differences between both IPsec
cipher suites are negligible. As all three results are still
similar, we allocate the moderate overall TCP goodput to
the runtime performance of the BMv2 P4 target. The low
throughput of BMv2 is due the fact that its use is intended
for testing and not for production purposes. Thus, the results
show that the overhead of our IPsec implementation on BMv2
only slightly reduces the TCP goodput and the impact of
encryption/decryption operations is negligible on this platform.
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(a) TCP goodput measured by iperf3 on the re-
ceiving host. Three variants are considered: without
IPsec forwarding (BYPASS), with IPsec forward-
ing but without encryption, and with IPsec for-
warding using the AES_CTR_HMAC_MD5 cipher
suite.
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(b) IPsec tunnel setup and renewal times. Times
are measured on the controller from initiation to
completion of these processes.
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(c) Times for creation of a single SA, insertion of
a single MAT entry, and update of a single MAT
entry. Times are measured on the controller from
initiation to completion of these processes.
Fig. 19. Measurement results for experiments with P4-IPsec using BMv2 software switches in a virtual environment with almost zero link delays. Average
values are shown with confidence intervals for a significance of α = 5%.
C. Control Plane Evaluation
We investigate how P4-IPsec’s controller-based operation
of IPsec affects the time needed for IPsec tunnel setup and
renewal.
1) Experiment Description: In common IPsec deployment,
SAs are set up between two IPsec peers using IKE message
exchange. In P4-IPsec, an SDN controller sets up and renews
IPsec tunnels, which may take longer due to controller oper-
ation and table updates on P4 switches.
For IPsec tunnel setup, the SDN controller generates two
unidirectional SAs, installs them on both P4 switches, and
modifies the SPD MATs of both peers so that traffic is
protected using IPsec. In our experiment, we measure the time
for IPsec tunnel setup. It starts when the southbound connec-
tions between the SDN controller and the two P4 switches
are established and ends with the last confirmation of the
MAT modifications on the two P4 switches. For IPsec tunnel
renewal, the SDN controller generates one unidirectional SA
and installs it on both P4 switches. Tunnel renewal is triggered
by a P4 switch if the packet counter of a SA reaches the
soft packet limit. The measurement is started on the controller
when it receives the soft timeout notification from one P4
switch and it is stopped when the controller has received all
confirmations of the P4 switches about all MAT modifications.
Details of both operations including sequence diagrams can be
found in Section IV-D4. We recorded measurement data for
IPsec tunnel setup and tunnel renewal within the experiment
on TCP goodput for the AES_CTR_HMAC_MD5 cipher suite
as described before.
In the testbed environment, latency on the management link
between the SDN controller and P4 switches is very low
as all components run on the same host and as we have
not configured any extra delay on the links. In real-world
deployments, link latencies are significant, but they impact
both IKE message exchange and controller-based operation
of IPsec. By keeping the link latencies minimal, we derive an
upper bound on potentially additional latency due to controller
operation and MAT modification on P4 switches.
2) Results & Discussion: Figure 19(b) depicts the measured
averages for IPsec tunnel setup and renewal times. Tunnel
setup takes 5.02 ms while the time for tunnel renewal is
4.38 ms. These results show that control plane overhead is
low.
To further investigate both operations, we we also analyze
the durations of three major components: generating SA data,
inserting new MAT entries, and updating existing MAT entries.
Figure 19(c) depicts their average times. Generating keying
material for a unidirectional SA takes 0.084 ms. Installing
a new MAT entry via a write operation takes 0.702 ms.
Updating an existing MAT entry takes 0.587 ms. Thus, the
effort for key generation is almost negligible compared to
MAT modifications.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION ON HARDWARE P4 TARGETS
In the following, we describe implementation experiences
for the NetFPGA SUME and Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X
platform.
A. NetFPGA SUME
We give an overview of the platform and describe imple-
mentation experiences.
1) Overview on Platform & Development: NetFPGA
SUME is an open source hardware development board for pro-
totyping network applications. Its main part is a Xilinx Virtex-
7 690T FPGA with 4 SFP+ ports that acts as programmable
data plane. It supports throughput rates up to 100 GBit/s. The
NetFPGA SUME board can be programmed via the Software
Defined Specification Environment for Networking (SDNet)
[78], a proprietary predecessor of P4 from Xilinx. Support for
P4 programmability was introduced with the P4-NetFPGA tool
[82]. First, a P4-to-SDNet compiler translates P416 programs
into SDNet. Then, the SDNet compiler generates hardware
description language (HDL) blocks in Verilog that can be
validated in generic and platform-specific FPGA simulations.
Finally, the HDL representation is synthesized into a hardware
design to program the FPGA. In addition to the P4 program,
custom functions can be implemented in a HDL and included
in the hardware design. Programmers may implement custom
HDL blocks or integrate IP cores that can be used as P4 externs
in the P4 program. The P4-NetFPGA tool only supports
the SimpleSumeSwitch architecture, i.e., P4 programs defined
for more sophisticated architectures such as Portable Switch
Architecture (PSA) need to be transformed to this architecture.
2) Implementation Experiences: We report on implemen-
tation experiences about porting our software-based imple-
mentation P4-IPsec for the NetFPGA SUME board. First, P4-
NetFPGA is currently limited to packet header manipulation.
P4-IPsec requires modifications of packet payloads, i.e., we
were required to parse packet payloads as an additional header
field. As P4-NetFPGA does not support parsing variable-
length header fields, the implementation is limited to packets
with a fixed length. Second, P4-NetFPGA lacks a packet
streaming function for data exchange between the P4 pipeline
and P4 externs. Instead, data between the P4 pipeline and
externs is currently exchanged via blocks of bits. As this
data transfer needs to be executed within one clock cycle
of the FPGA, the data size is limited. We observed that this
limit is about 10 kbit for one function call. This limits the
maximum packet size to be processed through a P4 extern to
about 600 B. During the synthesis, the Vivado suite optimizes
the hardware implementation through several algorithms. In
various experiments, we observed a practical upper bound of
about 140 B for packets. Either the hardware implementation
did use more resources than offered by the FPGA, or data
transfer and calculation within the P4 extern exceeded one
clock cycle. A packet streaming function was announced in
2018, but is still not available. Last, we encountered several
more general problems with P4-SDNet and the NetFPGA
SUME board. Probably due to a bug, we were not able
to access the values of an LPM table for IP routing with
our SDN controller. We solved that problem by using exact
matching tables instead, an approach that is not acceptable
for a production implementation. In addition, we experienced
several stability problems. No matches in MATs were found
when data was written to hardware registers. Finally, we
missed many important details in the documentation. With
hope for improved support, we managed to implement a very
limited prototype. It only allows to apply the NULL cipher
on fixed-length packets that do not exceed a total length of
140 B.
Scholz et al. [83] report on implementation experiences
of cryptographic hashing functions in P4 data planes. The
NetFPGA SUME board is also one of the platforms examined
where the authors present results that correspond to our results.
As a workaround, the authors propose to move the externs
subsequent to the synthesized P4 program. However, the
workaround can be applied only if the P4 program does not
rely on the output of the extern. This makes it inapplicable
to P4-IPsec. Besides, implementing this workaround requires
extensive knowledge about HDLs and FPGA programming.
B. Edgecore Wedge with Tofino
We give an overview of the platform and describe why a
direct adoption of P4-IPsec is not feasible. We present two
workaround implementations and evaluate their performance
in experiments.
1) Overview on Platform & Development: Our testbed
switch, the Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X [84], features 32
QSFP28 network ports with throughput rates up to 100 Gbit/s.
The QSFP28 ports interface the Tofino switching ASIC from
Barefoot Networks which is fully programmable with P4. The
Tofino ASIC connects to a CPU module via PCIe. It features
an Intel Pentium D1517 processor (1.6 GHz, 4 cores), 8 GB
RAM, and a 32 GB SSD. For programming and managing the
Tofino ASIC, the CPU module runs the Barefoot P4 Software
Development Environment on top of a Linux-based operating
system. It loads and manages P4 programs during execution,
provides management APIs (e.g., P4Runtime), and exposes
an interface for network packet exchange between the P4
processing pipeline and the CPU module. Due to its optimiza-
tion for high-speed packet processing with bandwidths up to
multiple Tbit/s in data center or core networks, user-defined
P4 externs that may contain computation-intense functions are
not supported.
2) Workaround Implementations: In our first workaround
implementation, we relocate the P4 externs of P4-IPsec to the
main CPU module. Figure 20 depicts the concept. We replace
all P4 extern function calls in the P4 processing pipeline by
packet transfers via the CPU port to the main CPU module. On
the main CPU module, we use the IPsec kernel functions of the
Linux operating system for IPsec processing. We implement a
simple IPsec crypto manager program that translates P4-IPsec
configuration from the controller into IPsec configuration for
the Linux host. We implement the IPsec crypto manager in
Python 3. It relies on iproute2 commands to manage the SPD
and SAD of the Linux host.
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Fig. 20. First workaround implementation. We relocate IPsec processing to
the main CPU module that interfaces the Tofino switching ASIC via a PCIe
CPU port.
We briefly evaluate this first workaround implementation
with experiments on latency and TCP goodput. As depicted in
Figure 20, we attach two physical hosts running Ubuntu 16.04
LTS via 100 Gbit/s links to the front ports of the Wedge switch.
We enable IPsec on the link between H1 and the switch while
the link between the switch and H2 remains unprotected. First,
we measure the latency that is introduced by IPsec processing
and packet exchange with the CPU module. We send 100
ICMP echo requests from H1 to H2 and measure an average
round-trip time of about 1.5 ms. Second, we investigate on the
maximum TCP goodput. We generate TCP transmissions with
iperf3 in three experiments, each performed with five runs and
a duration of 30 s. For getting a reference, we measure the
maximum TCP goodput between the P4 processing pipeline
and the main CPU module. Therefore, we assign an IP address
to the virtual network interface of the CPU port on the main
CPU module and run iperf3 measurements between H1 and
the main CPU module. We measure an average TCP goodput
of about 3.3 Gbit/s. We consider this as upper bound for the
main CPU module. Now, we measure TCP goodput between
H1 and H2. When using the NULL cipher suite, we measure an
average TCP goodput of about 2 Gbit/s. For the AES-GCM-
256 cipher suite, the average TCP goodput drops to about
1.4 Gbit/s. We repeat the experiment for 16 concurrent IPsec
tunnels and calculate the average of 10 runs with a duration
of 300 s. The maximum TCP goodput remains at 2 Gbit/s for
IPsec with the NULL cipher suite and 1.4 Gbit/s for IPsec
with the AES-GCM-256 cipher suite. We attribute the large
differences in TCP goodput to the rather slow CPU with a base
frequency of 1.6 GHz. Still, we consider this a very reasonable
performance that might be sufficient for scenarios where only
few shared network resources should be accessed sporadically
by roadwarrior hosts.
In our second workaround implementation, we forward
IPsec-related flows to a crypto host. This approach is used
by several past works on integrating IPsec with fixed-function
SDN data planes (e.g., [45]). As depicted in Figure 21, we set
up a Linux crypto host for offloading IPsec processing. We
deploy the IPsec crypto manager program from the previous
workaround implementation as interface between the crypto
host and controller. We deploy a simple P4 program on the
Wedge switch that forwards IPsec flows based on a MAT.
The controller writes/edits the forwarding MAT on the Wedge
switch and sends configuration messages to the IPsec crypto
manager program.
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Fig. 21. Second workaround implementation. We forward IPsec-related flows
to a Linux crypto host.
For a simple evaluation, we set up a crypto host with an Intel
Xeon Gold 6134 CPU (8 cores, 16 threads), 128 GB RAM, and
a 240 GB SSD, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. We perform the
same experiments as for the first workaround implementation.
The round-trip time is about 2 ms which is slightly larger than
in the previous approach. Figure 22 compares TCP goodput
results for IPsec tunnels with the AES-GCM-256 cipher suite
of both workaround implementations. For a single IPsec tunnel
with the AES-GCM-256 cipher suite, we measure an average
TCP goodput of about 4 Gbit/s. It can be increased by running
multiple connections over the same crypto host. For 16 parallel
IPsec tunnels, we measure an overall average TCP goodput
of about 24 Gbit/s. This effect can be attributed to receive-
side scaling (RSS) of the network interface card, which can
leverage multiple cores, but only one per IPsec tunnel. In case
of multiple IPsec tunnels, the overall TCP goodput can be
increased through RSS by leveraging the processing power of
more than a single core. Crypto capacity can be scaled up by
increasing the number of crypto hosts connected to the switch.
TCP goodput on each crypto host can be further improved by
optimization techniques as presented in Section III-C.
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Fig. 22. Average TCP goodput for both workaround implementations and
1-16 IPsec tunnels with the AES-GCM-256 cipher suite.
Chen [85] presents an implementation of AES encryption
for Tofino-based P4 switches. It uses a novel Scrambled
Lookup Table technique that allows througput rates of up to
10.92 Gbit/s for AES-128. However, the current concept is
limited to blockwise encryption of packets with a maximum
payload size of 16 bytes so that it is in its current form not a
suitable base for IPsec support. If subsequent versions of this
work introduce block chaining, integrating P4-IPsec could be
an interesting follow-up work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed the first implementation of IPsec
in P4. The proposed data plane implementation features ESP
in tunnel mode and provides support for multiple cipher suites
with the help of P4 externs. P4-IPsec supports automated op-
eration of IPsec in host-to-site and site-to-site scenarios. IPsec
tunnels are set up and managed by an SDN controller based on
predefined tunnel profiles. For interaction with remote hosts
in host-to-site scenario, we introduce a client agent for Linux
hosts. We introduced the fundamentals of IPsec and data plane
programming with P4, gave an extensive review on related
work, and presented the architecture of P4-IPsec.
P4 programmable data planes open up the possibility of
implementing IPsec on SDN-capable data plans for the first
time. However, the implementation on P4 switches is still chal-
lenging. For the BMv2 software switch, the implementation
was straightforward, but moderate data rates make its practical
application difficult. The controller-supported signaling was
not a bottleneck, however. Due to platform limitations of the
NetFPGA SUME board, we were not able to build a working
prototype. Our results for the Tofino-based Wedge switch are
more promision: Even though this P4 switch does not support
P4 Externs, we presented two workaround implementations
that either use the main CPU module or an external crypto
host.
We have shown that security use cases can benefit from P4,
but crypto functions are still missing on many P4 hardware
switches. Therefore, we advocate for P4 hardware targets that
either include P4 externs for those operations or offer powerful
interfaces so that developers can run individual functions on
the CPU module of such switches. Such features have the
potential to massively foster the deployment of P4 targets in
practice and stimulate further network research.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
SDN software-defined networking
ONF Open Network Foundation
OF OpenFlow
ODP Open Data Plane
NFV Network Function Virtualization
VNF virtual network function
SFC Service Function Chaining
BMv2 Behavioral Model version 2
MAT match-and-action table
VPN Virtual Private Network
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ESP Encrypted Secured Payload
AH Authentication Header
PPF packet processing function
SP security policy
SPD Security Policy Database
SA security association
SAD Security Association Database
PAD Peer Authentication Database
SPI Security Parameter Index
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange v2
IPComp IP Payload Compression
AE authenticated encryption
ICV Integrity Check Value
IV initialization vector
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC cipher block chaining
CTR counter
GCM galois/counter mode
SHA secure hash algorithm
TLS Transport Layer Security
PKI public key infrastructure
SoC system on a chip
FPGA field programmable gate array
NPU network processing units
ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
NIC network interface card
NPU network processing unit
APU accellerated processing unit
DPDK Data Plane Development Kit
SDNet Software Defined Specification Environment for
Networking
HDL hardware description language
HLIR high-level intermediate representation
RTL Register Transfer Level
PSA Portable Switch Architecture
TTL time to live
INT in-band network telemetry
LPM longest-prefix matching
CLI command line interface
FSM finite state machine
API application programming interface
LLDP Link Layer Discovery Protocol
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